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ABSTRACT
Data protection and retention legislation are increasingly
important in a society where an individual can communicate, buy
and sale goods electronically, tand post information on the internet,
all on a global level. A side-effect of this increased access to the
global community is the increased difficulty of regulating access to
private information. However, some countries are responding by
increasing their legislation over the transfer of information across
their borders, and the European Union ("EU") is leading this
charge. The EU implemented its original privacy directive in 1997
and since that time, every EU Member State has enacted some
form of privacy legislation. EU Member States require that any
state or entity seeking access to the information of their citizens
must have comparable data protection standards in place.
Therefore, in an effort to increase trade opportunities, several non-
EU states have enacted such legislation as well. These privacy
standards are the focus of this article, looking first at the basic
aspects of the three main data protection sources: the European
Union privacy directives, the European Council on Cybercrime
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and the European Council on Cybercrime. This
article also addresses specific legislation enacting data protection
measures in the United Kingdom and the United States, and
finally, it addresses some of the concerns associated with
increased data protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data protection has been viewed as a fundamental human right in
Europe since a decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court in
1983 recognized that there is a "right to informational self-
determination."' Members of the European Community have been
implementing their own privacy laws since 1970, with the vast
* The author is juris doctor candidate at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law,
class of 2007. The author holds degrees from the University of North Texas, Bachelor of Arts,
Political Science; Master of Arts, Political Science.
I CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 16 (Oxford
Univ. Press) (2003), citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court], Nov. 15, 1983, 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1
(F.R.G.).
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majority enacting some sort of national legislation by 1990.2 These
national legislative acts usually had four common factors:
typically they apply to both public and private sectors; they
apply to a wide range of activities, including data collection,
storage, use and dissemination; they impose affirmative
obligations (often including registration with national
authorities of anyone wishing to engage in any of these
activities); and they have few, if any, sectoral limitations.
However, with establishment of the European Union ("EU"), the
legislative acts regarding electronic privacy transfer were solidified
first in the EU Directive from 1997 and finally, in its amended form in
2002.4
This article provides the reader with a foundation of knowledge of
the important sources of data protection legislation internationally,
including citations to the leading authorities on these institutions; and
includes discussions on the major recent developments in the area of
data protection and retention in the EU. The EU Directive, as the
leading force of privacy regulation in the world, is the focus of the first
section of this paper. Subsequent sections briefly discuss the other
agencies regulating the transfer of electronic data, namely, the
European Council on Cybercrime and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") Guidelines, followed by a
discussion of legislation from the United Kingdom and the United
States in response to these regulations.
1I. THE EUROPEAN UNION PRIVACY DIRECTIVES
In order to provide a firm understanding of the effect of the EU
Directive, it is important to understand how the EU system works.
The EU Commission, as the executive arm of the EU, proposes
legislation and monitors how the legislation is implemented by the
Member States.5  Perhaps the most important role that the EU
2 Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the
Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 1001 (1998).
3id.
4 KuNER, supra note 1, at 20.
'Id. at 6.
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Commission plays, in terms of data retention and protection, is
determining when a non-EU state has implemented sufficient
legislation to offer an "'adequate level' of data protection" before
allowing data transference between two or more countries.6 There are
both substantive and procedural factors which must be met before an
EU Member State will transfer data to another state. The substantive
factors include the purpose for collecting the data, the quality and
proportionality of the data, the transparency and security of the
procedure, the rights of access to the data, and the restrictions on
transferring the data to any other third parties.7 The procedural factors
include a high level of compliance with the rules, they require: a
procedure for allowing individuals to exercise their privacy rights, and
a procedure for allowing redress to individuals whenever the
substantive rules are broken. The EU Commission can grant access to
electronic data either wholesale, if the requesting state has
implemented legislation that falls within the guidelines directly above,
or on a case-by-case basis for certain projects.8 Currently, the only
States which have been approved to transfer data freely with EU
Member States are Guernsey, Isle of Man, Switzerland, the U.S. (for
corporations that have signed up and agreed to abide by the
procedures/requirements of the Safe Harbor provisions), Canada, and
Argentina.9 Once a state's data protection legislation has been deemed
adequate by the EU, no Member State can deny the transfer of
personal information to that State. Moreover, if a violation of the data
protection legislation occurs, it is the responsibility of the Member
State, and not the EU, to prosecute or rectify the situation.' 0
The two primary pieces of EU legislation are the General Directive
(Directive 95/46), which provides a framework for data protection, and
the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (Directive
61d,
7 Id. at 132-134.
8 Id.
9 Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, available at http://europa.eu.int/comn/justicehome/fsj/privacy/
thridcountries/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
0 DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED
STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 27-28 (2005).
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2002/58), which provides more specific regulations." The purpose of
the EU General Directive is to "allow for the free flow of data within
Europe" and to "achieve a harmonized minimum level of data
protection throughout Europe."'12 The principles spelled out in the
General Directive reflect these two purposes. These principles are:
* Legitimacy: personal data may only be processed for
limited purposes;
* Finality: personal data may only be collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and may
not be further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes;
" Transparency: the data subject must be given
information regarding data processing relating to
him;
* Proportionality: personal data must be adequate,
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes
for which they are collected and further processed;
* Confidentiality and security: technical and
organizational measures to ensure confidentiality
and security must be taken with regard to the
processing of personal data; and
* Control: supervision of processing by Data
Protection Authorities ("DPAs") must be ensured.' 3
In order for a business or organization to be able to collect private
information on individuals over the Internet, the above six principles
must be somehow accounted for. In general, the EU Directive
prohibits "listening, taping, storage or other kinds of interception or
11 KUNER, supra note 1, at 23-24; Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) (EC); Council
Directive 2002/58 2002 O.J. (L. 201) (EC).
1Id. at 17.
"3Id. at 17-18.
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surveillance of communications. The communications service
providers are obligated to delete all traffic data no longer required for
the provision of a communications service.' ' 4  However, there are
some exceptions for national defense security, criminal law, 15 and for
"purely personal or household" uses.
While the EU Commission is responsible for proposing legislation
and monitoring the manner in which the Member States implement the
legislation, ultimately the final word in enforcement lies with the
Member States themselves. Member States are also responsible for
developing national legislation and creating a national DPA17 as part
of their national legislation. 18  The legislation enacted by the
individual Member States does not have to be completely uniform, but
it does have to follow some standards. The laws have to meet the
minimum standards of the Directive without being so intrusive so as to
"impede data flows with other Member States (the maximum)." 19 Just
as the national privacy legislation of the Member States can differ
from each other, so too can the set-up of the DPA in each state. The
DPA can either operate as a commission or with a single
ombudsman.20  The DPA's also act in an advisory role by giving
advice to companies who are engaged in electronic commerce in their
countries, though the companies are not obligated to consult with the
DPA.21
With the establishment of both EU privacy laws and laws in each
of the Member States, a common question is what law applies when a
14 Abu Bakar Munir & Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, Retention of Communications Data: A Bumpy
Road Ahead, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 731 (2004).
15 KUNER, supra note 1, at 19.
16 HEISENBERG, supra note 10, at 29.
17 Article 28 of the General Directive requires that each Member State set up a national DPA
(Data Protection Authority). Council Directive 95/46, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) (EC).
DPA's typically have enforcement duties under the federal data protection laws, but also may
play an advisory role at the state and local level. KUNER, supra note 1, at 13-14.
18 id.
'9 Id. at 28-30.
" Id. at 14.
21 Id. at 14-16.
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conflict arises. The EU Commission is charged with monitoring the
legislation of the Member States to ensure that they coml.y with the
six principles of the EU Directive set forth above. If the
Commission finds that a Member State is in breach, a number of
options can be implemented. First, the Commission can send the State
a letter reminding them of their obligation. 23 A second option is to
refer the case to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), which is the
only organ that can legally interpret the data protection legislation.24
The ECJ then has the ability to either "find the Member State in breach
or impose a fine."
25
The EU Directive created a safe environment for the transfer of
data between member states. However, problems could arise
regarding trade with states outside the EU systems if comparable
legislation is not in place to protect any private information that might
pass hands. This has led to the development of similar data protection
laws in several states outside the EU system.26
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE EU DIRECTIVE
A. LINDQVIST DECISION
One of the recent developments stemming from the EU Directives
is that certain provisions are being considered by international courts
such as the ECJ. The Lindqvist decision out of the ECJ is among the
most important because it was the first decision that interpreted
2 2 Id. at 6.
23 KUNER, supra note 1, at 3 1.
" Id. at 7.
25 Id. at 31.
26 Swire, supra note 2, at 1002; additionally, a list of third countries the EU has determined
have adequate levels of protection can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justicehome/
fsj/privacy/thridcountries/indexen.htm. Currently only Argentina, Canada, Switzerland, the
U.S. (through the Passenger Name Record agreement and Safe Harbor provisions), Guernsey,
and Isle of Man have been recognized as having adequate safeguards. Further information on
the E.U. Directive can be found in CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND
ONLINE BUSINESS (Oxford Univ. Press) (2003), and in PETER P. SWIRE AND ROBERT LrrAN,
NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOwS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (Brookings Institution Press) (1998).
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Directive 95/46.27 Mrs. Lindqvist, in her position as a catechist for her
parish, set up a website from her home that was accessible through the
parish's official website.28 Lindqvist's website contained information
about herself, her husband, and other parishioners including names,
jobs, telephone numbers, and other personal information including the
medical circumstances of one individual.29 The information about the
individuals on the website was obtained and posted without their
consent.
30
The website was promptly removed once Lindqvist learned of the
discontent of the individuals whose personal information she had
posted.3' In addition to failing to consult the persons from the parish,
Lindqvist also did not consult the Swedish supervisory authorities who
are charged with the processing of personal data.32 As a result, she
was prosecuted under Swedish law for failing to provide the
authorities with prior written notice, processing personal information
(including medical information), and transferring this data to third
countries without adequate data protection laws.
3 3
Mrs. Lindqvist was convicted and fined, though she appealed the
decision arguing that her actions did not violate the Directive. 34 The
case came under consideration of the ECJ when the Swedish courts
referred the following questions to the court.35 First, does the listing of
personal data fall under the provision of the Directive prohibiting "the
processing of 'personal data wholly or partly by automatic means'?" 36
27 Flora J. Garcia, Bodil Lindqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer's Violation of the European
Union's Data Protection Directive Should Be a Warning to US. Legislators, 15 FoRDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1219 (2005).
28 Case C-101/01, In re Lindqvist, 2004 All E.R. 561.
29 Id.
30 id.
31 1d.
32 id.
33 Id.
341In re Lindqvist, 2004 All E.R. at 561.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 562.
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
If not, did the website violate "the processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or
are intended to form part of a filing system within the meaning of
Article 3(1)"h3 by making it possible to search the individuals by first
name?38  The Court determined that the information posted by
Lindqvist did fall under the definition of "personal data" and that by
posting the information on her home computer, she was in fact
"processing" the personal data.3 9
As the answers to the above questions were yes, the following
questions became relevant. First, were the actions of Lindqvist
covered as one of the exceptions in Article 3(2)?40 According to this
provision, if the processin of personal information "falls outside the
scope of Community law' or "by a natural person in the course of a
purely personal or household activity,' 42 then it falls outside the scope
of the Directive.4 3 Lindqvist sought to qualify her actions under the
latter of these categories by arguing that when one processes
information "free of charge and without any economic activity," 4 the
Directive does not control.45  The Court found that although
Lindqvist's actions did fall outside the scope of Community law, they
were not purely personal or household activities because the
information extended beyond an intimate group and was accessible to
anyone through the church's website. 46 Moreover, the Court, when
faced with the question of whether the posting of information, such as
the name of an individual and the fact that she has an injured foot, fall
37 Id. at 569.
38
1d.
39 Id. at 570.
40 In re Lindqvist, 2004 All E.R. at 569.
41 Id. at 571 (quoting European Council Directive 95/46, art. 3(1)).
4 2 id.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 id.
46 In re Lindqvist, 2004 All E.R. at 686.
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under the health provision of Article 8(1), the Court answered in the
affirmative.47
The next question set forth by the Swedish Court is whether the
fact that information posted on a website in Sweden could be accessed
by persons from a third country means that it "constitute(s) a transfer
of data to a third country within the meaning of the Directive? ''48 A
related question is whether the answer to the question directly above
differs if no one from a third country actually accessed the Swedish
website.49 The Court found that the act of merely uploading data to a
website that can be accessed by other persons cannot constitute a
transfer of data.50 Anything to the contrary would mean that Member
States would have an obligation to prevent the loading of personal
information because it could possibly be seen by person in third
countries which do not have adequate data protection procedures in
place.51
Finally, the Swedish Court set forth questions dealing with the
scope of the Directive. First, do the restrictions of the Directive
violate freedom of expression as set forth in Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms?52 The Court held that the Directive itself was not contrary
to the right to freedom of expression and that the Member States' duty
to implement legislation supports both data protection goals and
freedom of expression. 53 Finally, can EU Member States implement
greater privacy protection standards than those provided by the
Directive? 54 The Court answered that so long as the provisions of the
Member State are consistent with the Directive, there is nothing that
47 Id. at 583. Article 8(1) states: "Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life." Council
Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) 1 (EC).
48 Id. at 569.
49 id.
50 Id. at 586.
51Id. at 586.
In re Lindqvist, 2004 All E.R. at 569.
53 Id. at 588.
'Id. at 569.
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prevents that State from extending their legislation to areas outside the
Directive.
5 5
The implications of this decision could be far-reaching. It is now
clear that the Directive is applicable to individuals and that it covers
violations that affect even a small number of people. 56 Thus, within
the EU system, individuals whose personal information is posted on a
website without their consent now have a cause of action.5
7
B. BINDING CORPORATE RULES
One of the disadvantages of the EU Directive has been that some
companies, which are located in third countries that have not made a
contractual agreement with the EU to engage in multinational
transfers, have been disadvantaged in the corporate market.5 8 The
Article 29 Working Party, as defined in the Directive, has attempted to
address this problem by developing a list of corporate rules which, if
agreed to, would bind the corporation and bring them into compliance
with the minimum adequate safeguards required by the Directive.59
The checklist set forth by the Working Group establishes the
guidelines to show what companies must do/show when they apply for
approval.6 ° Seven primary issues are addressed in the Working
Document.
Which data protection authority is the right one for
your company to apply to?
"Id. at 705.
56 Garcia, supra note 27, at 1230.
57 Id.
58 Eduardo Ustaran, Binding Corporate Rules: The Answer to Global Processing?
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (2006), available at
https://www.privacyassociation.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=463&Ite
mid=125.
59 Id.
60 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document Establishing a Model
Checklist Application for Approval of Binding Corporate Rules (Apr. 14, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wpIO8-en.pdf (more in
depth information on each of these categories can be found at this cite).
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* Information required for application.
* Evidence that the measures are internally and
externally binding.
* Verification of compliance.
* Description of the processing and flows of
information, including the purpose and scope of the
information.
* Description of the data protection safeguards.
* Description of the reporting and recording system of
61the corporation.
Although this piece of legislation sought to decrease inequalities
among corporate competitors, there have been some criticisms of the
Binding Corporate Rules ("BCR"). The most pressing of these
concerns is that approval is determined on a case-by-case basis by the
member states. 62 Just because a corporation has met the guidelines
does not mean that they are automatically eligible to make data
transfers with every Member State.63 Moreover, because the national
implementation of the Directive differs for each Member State it is not
even clear as to whether the BCR would meet the minimum
requirements in each State.64 Although this system is less than perfect,
it is a start for corporations who otherwise would be shut out of a
growing market.
While the EU Directives have been the catalyst for most of the
privacy legislation that has sprung up around the world,65 there are
61ild
"
61 John Stephens, ICRT Comments on Binding Corporate Rules 2, INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS ROUNDTABLE (2003), available at
http://www.icrt.org/pos_papers/2003/030930_EE.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 HEISENBERG, supra note 10, at 120.
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other sources on which a state may base its privacy legislation.
Following is a brief discussion of two such bodies of law: the
European Council on Cybercrime and the OECD.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON CYBERCRIME
The Cybercrime Convention ("Convention") as opposed to the EU
Directives is focused primarily at preventing crimes that take place
through or on the computer.6 6 It was drafted and adopted into law in
November 2001, by the Council of Europe, an organization that has
67forty-four member states. Since its adoption by the Council of
Europe, it has been signed by over thirty countries and ratified by
eleven, and consequently entered into force in 2004.68 In order to
enter into force, the Convention needed to be ratified by five countries,
three of which are members of the Council of Europe (which the above
stated countries are). Now in force, the Convention acts as a
multilateral treaty, binding the countries in a similar fashion.69 The
Convention is the first international treaty that addresses crimes that
take place on and through computer systems.7°
The goal of the Convention is to establish a minimum set of
guidelines that states can integrate into their domestic laws.7 1 The
purpose of making these regulations so general is to permit them to fit
into the domestic legal systems of each participating state. 72 This is
6U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ), Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminai/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
67 id.
68 Global Internet Policy Initiative, Trust and Security in Cyberspace: The Legal and Policy
Framework for Addressing Cybercrime 4, (2005), available at
http://www.intemetpolicy.net/cybercrime/20050900cybercrime.pdf.
69 Id.; Mike Keyser, Article: The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 12 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 287, 296 (2003).
7 0 Yamin Akdeniz, An Advocacy Handbook for the Non Governmental Organisations 3
(2005), available at http://www.cyber-rights.orglcybercrime/coehandbookcrcl.pdf.
71 USDOJ, supra note 66.
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particularly difficult given the increased privacy protections given to
individuals in European states and the heightened personal rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the U.S. 73 The primary reasons for
establishing an international set of guidelines for dealing with
cybercrime are
(1) the absence of a global consensus on the types of conduct
that constitute a cybercrime; (2) the absence of a global
consensus on the legal definition of criminal conduct; (3) the
lack of expertise on the part of police, prosecutors and courts
in the field; (4) the inadequacy of legal powers for
investigation and access to computer systems, including the
inapplicability of seizure powers to computerized data; (5)
the lack of uniformity between the different national
procedural laws concerning the investigation of cybercrimes;
(6) the transnational character of many cybercrimes; and (7)
the lack of extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties,
synchronized law enforcement mechanisms that would
permit international cooperation in cybercrime
investigations, and existing treaties that take into account the
dynamics and special requirements of these investigations. 74
The offenses were based upon recommendations from both private
and public organizations. 75  They deal with nine different offenses
including: "illegal access, illegal interception, data interference,
system interference, misuse of devices, computer-related forgery,
computer-related fraud, offenses related to child pornography and
offenses related to copyright., 76 The objective is to "pursue . . . a
common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against
cybercrime. . . especially by adopting appropriate legislation and
73 Shannon L. Hopkins, Cybercrime Convention: A Positive Beginning to a Long Road Ahead,
2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2003).
74 Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized
Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process? 23
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 329,335 (2005).
75 Keyser, supra note 69, at 299.
76 Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 74, at 336.
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fostering international co-operation.''7 Among the provisions of the
Convention are regulations on the minimum laws which must be
adopted by the participating states, the procedural and prosecutorial
laws that must accompany them, the rules on how states are to
participate in international investigations, and the specifics of applying
the Convention.78
Each year there are more than $15 billion globally in damages as a
result of cvber crime,79 the majority of which are perpetrated by
employees. ° A perpetrator in the U.S. can commit a crime that can
affect persons throughout the world. It is for this reason that
jurisdiction to prosecute cyber crimes is such a problem. The
Convention addresses these issues by requiring states to take
jurisdiction over any cyber crimes that are: "committed within its
territory, on board a ship flying that state's flag, on board an aircraft
registered under the laws of that state or by one of its nationals if
punishable by criminal law where committed.",8 1 However, situations
can, and have arisen where jurisdiction is questionable. This is an
issue that has not been sufficiently dealt with by the Convention.
While the U.S., overall, appears to be supportive of the Convention
(President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice
and consent in November 2003),82 there have been some major
critiques of the Convention including concerns by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), a public interest research center,
and the Center for Democracy and Technology ("CDT"). 83  In a
statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations, EPIC expressed
concerns about the possible civil liberty violations threatened by the
Convention. 84  An example of the possible violations includes an
77 Keyser, supra note 69, at 297.
78 id.
79 Hopkins, supra note 73, at 108.
'0 Id. at 109.
" Id. at 118.
82 USDOJ, supra note 66.
83 Critiques from EPIC can be found at http://www.epic.org; Critiques from the CDT can be
found at http://www.cdt.org.
84 Letter from Marc Rotenberg, EPIC President & Cedric Laurant, EPIC Director,
International Privacy Project, Policy Counsel to Sen. Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senate Foreign
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invasion of privacy through investigatory measures taken without the
protection of judicial review. 85 Moreover, the privacy safeguards that
are provided for in the Convention are too vague and weak to be in any
way meaningful.86 A concern, focused on law enforcement, is that the
Convention does not require the violative action to be a crime in bothjurisdictions.87 So long as an action is a crime in one country, any
others involved are required to aid in the investigation and prosecution
even if the action is legal in their territory. 88 The final concern of
EPIC is that the Convention has not been widely ratified, thus pointing
to the hesitancy of many countries to hold themselves responsible for
carrying out the obligations of the Convention. 89
The CDT's apprehensions also focus on civil liberty issues.
Among their concerns, the organization urges the Council of Europe to
reject provisions that will "require Internet Service Providers to retain
records regarding the activities of their customers" 90 because they are
at odds with provisions of the European Directive.91 Moreover, the
CDT is concerned with the criminal consequences for engaging in
copyright infringement, particularly since it is an area in which there
has not been a clear principle of international law developed.92
Finally, the CDT shares some of the same law enforcement concerns
as EPIC. In particular, they are concerned that there is no uniform
Relations Committee Chairman & Sen. Joseph R. Biden, J.R., U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Ranking Member (July 26, 2005), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/senateletter-072605.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Criticism].
8 Id. at 1.
86Id. at2.
87 Id. at 3-4.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 4-5.
90 Center for Democracy & Technology, International Issues: Cybercrime, (Oct. 18, 2000),
available at http://www.cdt.org/intemational/cybercrime/001018cdt.shtml (last visited Feb.
12, 2006).
91Id.
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procedure for investigations.93 It is yet to be seen whether these
concerns will come to fruition.
V. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") came into force on September 30, 1961.94 There are thirty
states that are parties to the OECD.95 The organization adopted The
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data in 1980 (Privacy Guidelines), thus becoming the first
intergovernmental organization to issue guidelines in the privacy
arena.96 These principles are meant to reflect the three main goals of
the OECD including: "pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights
and open market economies. 97
The OECD is divided into five sections:
The first sets forth definitions of data controllers,
personal data, and transborder flows of personal
data, as well as setting forth the scope of the
guidelines.98
93 id.
94 Article 14 specifies when this Convention goes into effect. See OECD, Organisationfor the
Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/document/7/
0,2340,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2006); OECD,
Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/l/
0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1 ,00.html (last visited Aug.6, 2006).
951d. (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States).
96 OECD, Protection of Privacy and Personal Data, http://www.oecd.org/document/26/
0,2340,en_2649_34255_1814170_1_1_1_1,00.html. (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
97 OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 7, (2002)
[hereinafter OECD].
98 Id. at 13-14.
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* The second section sets forth the seven principles of
the guidelines. The principles are a limitation of the
collection of personal data, the data quality
principle, the requirement that the purposes for
personal data should be specified, a limitation on the
disclosure of personal data, the protection through
use of reasonable safeguards, a policy of openness, a
requirement giving rights to individuals regarding
the use of their data, and insuring that controllers are
accountable for compliance with the principles laid
out above. 99
* The third section deals with how states will deal
with transborder flows of information.'00
* The fourth section deals with how member states are
to comply on a national level.101
* Finally, section five addresses how states are to
share information and investigatory powers with
each other. 0 2
The objectives of the OECD Guidelines are to achieve a minimum
standard of privacy protection among the parties, to reduce the
differences between the domestic laws, to avoid interfering with the
free flow of information, and finally to reduce the restrictions on
international information transfers due to individual privacy risks these
restrictions might cause. 10 3  However, as with most other data
protection legislation, questions remain as to whom the rules should
apply and under what circumstances. For instance, do the protections
apply equally to corporations as they do to individuals? Should certain
" Id. at 14-16.
'00Id. at 16-17.
0' Id. at 17.
°
2 Id. at 18.
'03 OECD, supra note 97, at 32.
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groups, such as persons with disabilities or minors, receive greater
protection? 10 4 These are questions which have not yet been answered,
but the OECD, along with other governmental and non-governmental
organizations are addressing these concerns. The OECD has issued
subsequent guidelines, including the 1985 Declaration on Transborder
Data Flows and the Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of
Privacy on Global Networks.1
0 5
The above discussions of the EU Directive, the Cybercrime
Convention, and the OECD Guidelines represent the growing field of
privacy legislation addressing the transborder flows of information.
Some are primarily focused on preventing cyber crimes, while others
focus on protecting individual's rights during the transfer of electronic
data. However, each of them is focused on the regulation of
information via the computer. These actions, even though they can
affect multiple persons in multiple locations, usually fall under the
jurisdiction of one state. The following are examples of how two
domestic legal systems have dealt with electronic privacy issues. First,
a discussion of the legislation coming out of the United Kingdom - a
member of the EU, and second, a discussion of legislation from the
U.S.
VI. UK LEGISLATION
After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the world became
much more concerned with protecting itself against terrorist attacks.
The United Kingdom is no different in its desire to retain electronic
data for the purposes of national security. Among the legislation
passed by the UK are the Identity Cards Bill (2005), the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and
Security Bill Act of 2001.
A. IDENTITY CARDS BILL (2005)
In response to the recent terrorist attacks in London and around the
world, several governments have considered establishing a national
identification card system. The UK has joined these countries and
introduced the Identity Cards Bill which, if passed, is expected to be in
'04 Id. at 34.
1o5 Id.
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effect by 2010.116 The ID cards will include biometric features,
including facial images, iris patterns, and fingerprints. 0 7 The rationale
behind these new precautions is protection against identity theft, illegal
immigration and working, misuse of public services, and perhaps most
importantly, organized crime and terrorism. 10 8 The government claims
that the ID cards will be a more secure form of identification because
the personal details of each individual will be checked upon their
application, recording procedures will keep individuals from assuming
multiple identities, and it will be harder to forge identity documents
since the new ID's will be checked electronically. 109
The Identity Cards Bill is justified partly on the basis that the EU
has begun: (1) requiring biometric passports for citizens of EU
Member States traveling to the Schengen region, and (2) supporting
biometric passports for foreim nationals seeking residency permits or
work visas within the EU."11 However, these biometric identification
cards have been the focus of much debate, both within the UK and
around the world. At the top of the list of problems with the new
identity cards is the cost."' Costs for the British system is estimated at
approximately $5.6 billion. 1 2 It appears that the current plan is for the
ID cards to be voluntary, however, some ministers are concerned that
this initial scheme will only pave the way for a future system in which
the cards, and thus registration in the national register, are required in
order to obtain documents such as a passport or driver's license.
1 3
106 Laura Rohde, UK Biometric ID Cards Bill Shelved Before Election: Labor Party blames
Conservatives for killing legislation, COMPUTER WORLD (Apr. 6, 2005) available at
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,100891,00.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2006).
107 Home Office, Identity Cards Briefing 4, (May 2005), available at
http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/downloads/IdCards_Briefing.pdf.
'° Id. at 1-3.
109 Id.
10 Id
111 Rohde, supra note 106.
112 Id.
3 George Jones, Tories Ambush Blair on Identity Cards TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (Dec. 27, 2005)
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2oo5/12/27/
nid27.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/12/27/ixnewstop.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
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B. REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT AND THE UK ANTI-
TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY BILL
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers ("RIP") Act of 2000 and
the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill ("ATCSB") (2001) allow
the government to track and analyze the patterns of citizens through
traffic analysis, blanket data retention, and mass-surveillance. 14
These acts allow the government to more easily intercept phone and e-
mail information by forcing phone companies and internet providers to
"install interception devices in their network." ' 15 The primary purpose
of the Act is to enhance the state's security capabilities by forcing the
retention of data for certain periods of time.' r However, there are a
number of secondary goals surrounding the implementation of this
legislation including: cutting off funding for terrorists, giving the
government the necessary tools for collecting information to fight
terrorism, streamlining immigration procedures, stopping religious and
racial hatred, safeguarding nuclear and aviation industries, increasing
the protection against chemical or biological weapons, increasing
police power, and complying with the obligations of the EU and
updating the state's anti-terrorist measures.117
The secondary goals stated above make up the fourteen parts of the
ATCSB. The twelve main principles are as follows:
* Part One: allows the government to investigate and
freeze any funds that could be used to finance
terrorist activities.
" Part Two: gives the government the ability to freeze
the assets of governments or residents overseas.
114 Casper Bowden, Closed Circuit Television for Inside your Head: Blanket Traffic Data
Retention and the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 5 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 1-2 (2002).
115 Ian Brown, Communications Surveillance Briefing, FIPR: FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION
POLICY RESEARCH (Aug. 18, 2003), http://www.fipr.org/030818ripa.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2005).
17 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill, 2001, H.C. Bill [49], (Gr. Brit.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/049/en/02049x--.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2005).
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" Part Three: allows the customs agency to share
information with law enforcement agencies.
* Part Four: allows for the government to detain
suspected terrorists, to speed up the asylum process,
and to remove judicial review of these actions.
" Part Five: makes religiously motivated crimes equal
to racially motivated crimes.
* Part Six: strengthens legislation regarding weapons
of mass destruction.
* Part Seven: increases the safeguards on chemical
and biological weapons.
* Part Eight: increases the inspection and regulation of
nuclear sites.
* Part Nine: increases restrictions in airports and
aircrafts to guard against terrorist activities.
* Part Ten: expands the police power of customs
agents, transport police, and ministry of defense
police.
* Part Eleven: re-affirms the authority of
communications service providers to retain data.
* Part Twelve: gives the courts jurisdiction over
crimes of bribery committed by foreign public
officials, Ministers, MPs and judges. 18
In addition to collecting and retaining data for security reasons,
these acts allow the government to access data for "public order, minor
crime, health and safety and tax.'119 Though companies are not
119 Bowden, supra note 114, at 8.
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obligated to record any data, once the government has lawfully
obtained it under this legislation, it can be retained for up to three
years. 12
0
VII. UNITED STATES LEGISLATION
While the approach of the EU to data protection is omnibus,
targeting public and private sectors, the U.S. aproach is more
sectoral, usually addressing only the public sector. The U.S. has
implemented two distinct pieces of legislation, each seeking to
regulate data protection in a separate manner.' 22 The first is the Safe-
Harbor Provision which is focused primarily on economic
provisions. 23  The second is the Passen-Rer Name Record which
focuses more on national security purposes.l24
A. THE SAFE-HARBOR PRIVACY PROVISION
The economic relationship between the EU and the U.S. made
creating a procedure for complying with the EU Directive a necessity
for the U.S. Over forty percent of U.S. investments abroad are located
in EU Member States and almost twenty percent of U.S. exports go to
the EU. 125  Therefore the U.S. adopted the Safe-Harbor Privacy
provision on November 1, 2000.126 The provision was deemed by the
EU Commission to be an adequate protection for electronic transfers
120Id. at 10, 13.
121 Steven Bellman et al., International Differences in Information Privacy Concerns: A
Global Survey of Consumers, 20 THE INFO. Soc'y 313, 315 (2004).
122 Europa, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemalrelations/us/
intro/pnrmem03_53.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006);
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index-en.htm.
123 U.S. Department of Commerce, Introduction to the Safe Harbor,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
124 HEISENBERG, supra note 10, at 140-142.
125 PATRICK R. HUGO, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 3 (Oceana
Publications, Inc) (2003).
126 HEISENBERG, supra note 10, at 74-75.
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thus allowing any company that signs the Safe Harbor Agreement to
freely transfer data to and from EU Member States. 127 There are seven
fair information principles that make up the Safe Harbor provisions.
They are:
* Notice: They will notify customers how they will
use their personal data, and before they transfer it to
another organization, or it is used for a purpose other
than that for which it was collected.
* Choice: They will allow customers to opt out before
sending their data to a third party or use it for a
different purpose.
* Onward Transfer: They may only transfer data to
another company (after giving notice and choice) if
that company is in Safe Harbor, or has some other
adequacy finding.
* Security: They must take reasonable precautions to
protect the data from loss, misuse, and unauthorized
access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction.
* Data Integrity: They should take reasonable steps to
ensure that data is reliable for its intended use,
accurate, complete, and current.
" Access: They must ensure that individuals have
access to the information that the companies have
about them, and be able to correct, amend, or delete
information that is inaccurate, except in cases where
the burden or expense of providing access would be
disproportionate to the risks to the individual's
privacy, or where the rights of persons other than the
individual would be violated.
127 id.
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* Enforcement: They must provide readily available
and affordable independent recourse for individuals
who believe their privacy has been violated,
investigation of each individual's complaints and
disputes, and award damages where appropriate. 128
A U.S. organization or company can send or receive electronic
data between itself and EU Member States by self-certifying annually
with the Department of Commerce, making a public declaration, and
agreeing to adhere to the safe harbor provisions. 129  Once an
organization or corporation agrees to adhere to the principles of the
Safe Harbor provision, they must subject themselves to both self-
enforcement and governmental enforcement. In terms of self-
enforcement, each organization must implement a dispute resolution
system, which will investigate individual complaints and develop
remedies for any compliance problems that arise. 130 Self-regulation,
however cannot be the only means of enforcement. Therefore, the
government, either through the Federal Trade Commission or another
regulatory agency, should step in when a company or organization
fails to comply with the self-regulatory principles. The punishment for
failing to comply with the Safe Harbor regulations includes monetary
damages or revocation of Safe Harbor benefits.' 31
B. PASSENGER NAME RECORD
The Passenger Name Record ("PNR") is a provision of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act which was passed by
Congress in November 2001.132 The Act requires airlines to gather
128 id.
129 U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
130ld.
131 Id. Forms and further information on the certification process a corporation must follow to
be covered under the Safe Harbor Provision can be found at the U.S. Department of
Commerce's website: http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html.
132 Europa, Airline Passenger Data Transfers from the EU to the United States (Passenger
Name Record), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal-relations/us/intro/
pnrmem03_53.htm (last visited Aug. 2006).
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passenger data on all commercial flights passing through the U.S.
This information includes: name, age, country of origin, height and
weight, race, where passenger would stay upon arrival, visa
information, and information from the purchase of the flight such as
email, credit card details, telephone numbers, dietary preferences and
other general remarks. 33 This information would then be entered into
a computer system that would screen for potential terrorists.' 34 This
information has been provided to the U.S. Customs and Border
Protections (USCBP) in an effort to guard against terrorism. 135
However, due to the nature and means of the information collected,
there has been conflict with the EU Directive.' 36 The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the EU Commission have struggled to
come to an agreement which would allow the U.S. to maintain its
system of collecting passenger data while still falling under the
guidelines of the EU privacy laws. Without an agreement, airlines
would be subject to fines from EU States.' 37
An agreement between DHS and the EU Commission was reached
in December 2003 which allowed airlines to share information with
the USCBP regarding flights that originated in EU countries.' 3 8 This
provisional agreement was based largely on the safeguards of the
USCBP system. 9 The EU Commission finally adopted an adequacy
finding in February 2004 which gives the USCBP access to PNR data
originating from Europe, though with certain limitations. 14' Despite
disagreement from the European Parliament, the EU Commission
announced the adequacy finding on May 17, 2004, and it was
133 HEISENBERG, supra note 10, at 140-142.
134 id
35 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: US-EU Passenger Name
Record Agreement Signed (May 28, 2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/displaycontent-3651 (last visited Nov. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Press Relase DHS].
136 Id.
137 id.
138 id.
139Id.
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approved by the Council. 141 In November 2005, the Advocate General
of the ECJ recommended the annulment of the agreement reached
between the EU and U.S. regarding the transfer of passenger data. 142
Though not binding on the Court, the Attorney General proposed that
the Court reverse not only the adequacy decision but also the
Council's decision. 143  It appears that the adequacy finding will be
challenged in the ECJ some time during 2006.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Data protection has become a hot topic within the international
community. Several legislative bodies have sought to deal with this
topic - some for the protection of individual privacy rights, some for
the protection of the government against terrorist acts. With the
tensions between these two goals, many states are torn between the
two, usually opting for legislation that addresses both concerns. The
UK and U.S. are two such examples. The UK, as a member of the EU,
has passed legislation protecting the rights of individuals in the
transborder transfer of data, but it has also passed the Identity Cards
Bill, the RIP Act, and the ATCSB, which focus on reducing terrorist
threats against the State. The U.S., in an effort to protect its economic
relationship with the EU has passed the Safe Harbor Provisions, which
provide adequate protections for the transfer of data. However, the
Bush Administration, in an effort to control terrorism in the U.S.,
implemented the PNR Provision, which threatened to stall airplane
travel between the U.S. and EU because of discrepancies in data
protection regulations.
The international bodies of law regarding data protection all strive
to create some degree of uniformity among the international
community. Despite the challenges of varying legal systems and
141 Press Relase DHS, supra note 135.
142 Digital Civil Rights in Europe, Advocate General European Court Rejects PNR Deal (Dec.
5, 2005) available at http://www.edri.org/issues/privacy/pnr (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
143 Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Advocate General Leger
Proposes Annulment of the Commission and Council Decisions on Transfer to the American
Authorities of Personal Information Concerning Air Passengers (Nov. 22, 2005) available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/actu/communiques/cp05/
aff/cp05OO98en.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2006); The full text of the Attorney General's
opinion can be found at http://curia.eu.int/en/actu/communiques/cp05/aff/cpO5OO98en.pdf.
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moral emphasis, it appear that these bodies of legislation will
increasingly gain adherence due to the increased global commerce
involving the transfer of electronic data as well as the increased
concerns of terrorism. For now, the EU Directive, Cybercrime
Convention, and the OECD Guidelines provide a good foundation on
which individual states can base their own data protection legislation.

